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Abstract
Th is article traces the development of Greek immigration policy during the last two decades with a view 
to explaining the role that parties, trade unions and other actors including the Church for instance have 
played in shaping this policy. Th e article outlines the reactive and piecemeal character of the policy, its 
important weakness in dealing eﬀ ectively with immigration ﬂ ows and the excessive red tape that charac-
terises it.  It is noted that nearly 20 years after the ﬁ rst migrants arrived in the country, Greek immigration 
policy remains short-sighted, dealing with immigration as a necessary evil and not as an opportunity. Th is 
lack of vision and the closed character of the policy has been supported directly or indirectly by both 
parties and trade unions. Th e two major parties have been until recently largely agreed in their exclusion-
ary views towards immigrants. It is only since 2004 that the Socialist party has changed its plans but it 
remains uncertain whether and how it would implement its radical (by Greek standards) pro-immigrant 
policies if it came to power. Overall, Greek political elites lack the political will to adopt a proactive and 
realistic migration policy plan. Th is is partly because migration neither wins nor loses national elections. 
And partly because they fear that stating publicly that Greece should accept economic immigrants 
through legal channels and that immigrants should become part of Greek society on a basis of equality 
and plurality would cost them votes.
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1. Introduction
Starting with inﬂ ows of co-ethnics from the former Soviet Union already during 
Perestrojka in the 1980s, Greece experienced massive immigration from the 
Balkan region (Albania in particular) and also from the wider Central and Eastern 
European region (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland among 
others) during the 1990s. While there is no more massive immigration during 
this decade, inﬂ ows have continued not only from the countries mentioned above 
but also from much more distant countries located in southeast Asia (Bangladesh 
and Pakistan) and sub-Saharan Africa.
Greek governments and Greek public opinion were unprepared to deal with 
these ﬂ ows when they started and it took ten years for a Greek immigration policy 
to take shape. My main aim in this study is to present and critically discuss the 
development of Greek migration policy from 1991 to the present with a view 
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to identifying the main factors that have shaped it, paying special attention to 
the role of political parties, trade unions, civil society actors and of course the 
European context within which these policies were formed. I discuss the develop-
ment of Greek migration policy distinguishing between two phases: the early 
phase spanning between 1991 and 2001, and the second phase covering the 
period between 2001 and today. Th e main features of each law are presented and 
their impact on the management of migration ﬂ ows and on immigrant integra-
tion is discussed critically. Special attention is paid to explaining why these par-
ticular laws were voted, what was the rationale that motivated diﬀ erent Greek 
governments to uphold an ineﬃ  cient and unrealistic policy for managing migra-
tion and immigrant integration. In the concluding section, I suggest that Greek 
migration policy has to date been shaped less by left and right wing ideologies or 
policy choices but rather by a weird combination of nationalist ideology, lack of 
political will and free market laissez faire principles.
2. Greek Immigration Policy in the 1990s: Arrest-and-Deport
On the eve of the 1990s when immigrant ﬂ ows started, Greece lacked a legislative 
frame for the control and management of immigration.1 Th e increasing migra-
tory pressures of the late 1980s led the Conservative government then in power 
to the design of law 1975/1991, which was enacted by the Greek Parliament in 
October 1991, formally applied in June 1992 and which remained in force until 
2001. Th is law was exclusively concerned with restricting migration – its title 
actually was: ‘Entry-exit, sojourn, employment, deportation of aliens, procedure 
for the recognition of alien refugees and other provisions’. Its main objectives were 
to prevent the entrance of undocumented immigrants and facilitate the expulsion of 
those already present in Greek territory, by means of simplifying the expulsion pro-
cedures, giving a certain degree of autonomy to local police and judiciary authorities 
and also penalising illegal alien stay in the country. Th e law aimed to bring Greece 
into line with its European partners, co-signatories of the 1990 Dublin convention 
(ratiﬁ ed by Greece by law 1996/1991) and members of the 1990 Schengen treaty, 
to which Greece was accorded observer status at the time.
More speciﬁ cally, a maximum time-period was set for residence and work per-
mits regarding certain types of employment, granted by the authorities (Article 23), 
along with a list naming categories of ‘unwanted aliens’ (Article 11). A special 
police force was established to maintain eﬀ ective border control and regulate 
deportations (Article 5). Th e conditions for recognition of refugee status were 
made stricter (Article 24), and sanctions were imposed on those who employed 
foreign workers without permission or helped them in any way to cross the 
1) Law 4310 of 1929, revised in 1948, mainly dealt with issues of emigration.
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border (Article 23). Moreover, the law deﬁ ned as a criminal action the entrance 
and stay of any alien in Greece without documents and residence permits, and 
legalized, in this manner, deportations and expulsions even in the transit zones 
(Article 27). According to that law, undocumented immigrants, in order to obtain 
residence and work permit, had to demonstrate to the police authorities within 
one month of entering the country, that they had a potential work contract with 
a speciﬁ c employer for a given period of time (Article 23). Additionally, the law 
required that the employment of non-nationals was allowed only when the job 
vacancy cannot be ﬁ lled by Greek citizens or EU nationals, in which case the 
Ministry of Labour would grant work permits for the speciﬁ c employment in 
question, only before the arrival of the foreign employees in Greece (Article 22). 
Th e law allowed for a certain degree of discretion to administrative authorities in 
the enforcement of its provisions. For example, the speciﬁ c police unit set up to 
patrol the borders was given the power to decide ad hoc who would or would not 
get permission for entry (Article 4, § 2, 7).
Non-governmental organisations and scholars criticized heavily law 1975/1991, 
among other things, for its lack of touch with reality: it ignored the de facto pres-
ence of several tens of thousands of foreigners in Greece. Indeed, the aim of that 
law was mainly to curb migration, to facilitate removals of undocumented migrants 
apprehended near the borders and, if that were possible, to remove all irregular 
aliens sojourning in Greece. Th e law made nearly impracticable the entry and stay 
of economic migrants, seeking for jobs. 
In the years that followed, hundreds of thousands immigrants came to Greece 
without documents, or permits.2 Th ey crossed the northern mountainous borders 
between Albania or Bulgaria and Greece on foot at night, or landed with small 
dinghies on the Greek islands of the Aegean or Crete (usually with the ‘help’ of 
human smuggling networks). Some arrived at Greek airports with tourist visas 
which they overstayed and others crossed the northern Greek borders by bus, 
pretending that they were travelling for leisure. It took more than ﬁ ve years for 
the Greek government to realise that immigrants were there to stay and the new 
phenomenon could not only be managed through stricter border control and 
massive removal operations. While a parliamentary committee was set up to 
2) According to SOPEMI (1999), in 1997 there were 74.500 legal migrants in Greece, of whom 6% were 
Albanians, 8% Bulgarians and 17% Russians (Romanians, Egyptians, Ukrainians and citizens from for-
mer Yugoslavia accounted for approx. 4% each). During the same period, several researchers estimated 
that there were approx. 400,000 undocumented immigrants living and working in Greece (R. Fakiolas, 
Recent eﬀ orts to regularise undocumented immigrants, WP/97/40/EN, European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 1997; T.P. Lianos, A.H. Sarris, and L.T. Kat-
seli, Illegal Immigration and Local Labour Markets: Th e Case of Northern Greece, 34/3 International 
Migration (1996) 449–484; P.H. Linardos Rylmond, ελληνική κοινωνία και η νέα μετανάστευση 
(Greek society and new migration), in Tetradia politikou dialogou, ereunas kai kritikis, 1995, 36–37, 
p. 61–71; A. Triandafyllidou and A. Mikrakis, Greece: A Ghost wanders through the Capital, in 
B. Baumgartl and A. Favell (Eds.), Th e New Xenophobia in Europe, London: Kluwer International Law, 
1995, pp. 165–179).
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discuss a draft migration law, parties lacked the political will to carry it forward 
and after three years of formal and informal talks (1993–1996) the Commission 
was dissolved without any speciﬁ c legal output. It was only at the end of 1997 
that two Presidential Decrees were issued introducing the ﬁ rst regularisation pro-
gramme in Greece. It is worth noting that neighbouring southern European 
countries like Spain and Italy faced with similarly large and unexpected ﬂ ows had 
already implemented a couple of ‘amnesties’ each regularising, especially Italy, 
large numbers of undocumented migrants. 
Why was Greece such a latecomer in regularisation policies? Th e causes are 
twofold. On one hand, Greece was not only traditionally a source country that 
had experience only in emigration rather than immigration policy, but it was also 
a country with a strong national identity based on an ethnic and cultural deﬁ ni-
tion of the nation.3 Immigration was thus seen not only as a factor of economic 
upheaval but also as a threat to the cultural and ethnic purity and authenticity of 
the nation. Political parties and other social actors, such as trade unions for 
instance, failed to see in this early period, that migration was not a phenomenon 
conﬁ ned to Greece and its region but rather a new reality aﬀ ecting the entire 
Europe and that it was not a phenomenon that could be dealt with restrictive 
measures alone. Th ere seemed to be a naive belief among politicians in this early 
period that faster and simpler deportation procedures could do the job. 
In the mid-1990s massive deportations, of Albanian citizens mainly, became a 
major immigration policy tool for the Greek government led by the Socialist 
Party (see Table 1). Th ey were used both as a means to deter irregular migrants 
from entering, to push those already in the country to leave by fear of being 
caught and deported literally overnight and, last but not least, they were a means 
for exerting pressure on the Albanian government with regard to this last’s treat-
ment of the Greek minority in Albania. Checks were enforced usually at public 
places, more often than not in locations where it was known that irregular migrant 
workers gathered to ﬁ nd daily employment or to meet co-nationals. Th ey took 
place under public view and people were loaded on buses and directed to Albania 
without sometimes having the possibility even to notify their relatives.
On the other hand, the lack of a more long term and realistic perspective in the 
development of a Greek migration policy at the time has to be seen also in its 
wider geopolitical context of that period. Greece faced in the early 1990s a new 
reality of political instability and even warfare in its Balkan neighbourhood. 
While ethnic conﬁ ct escalated into war in former Yugoslavia, Greece was con-
cerned that instability and conﬂ ict would come closer to its borders, not least 
through the so-called ‘Macedonian question’ and the presumed claims of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Greek territory and national culture.4 
3) Triandafyllidou, 2001, author please provide details.
4) V. Roudometof, Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Ques-
tion, 14 Journal of Modern Greek Studies (1996) 253–301.
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Th us, the 1990s in Greece were marked by the rise of a defensive type of national-
ism5 that prompted politicians both of the Left and the Right, and their voters to 
look inwards and try to ‘defend’ the nation from perceived internal and external 
‘enemies’ including not only neighbouring ‘Macedonia’ but also Albanian citizens 
who were settled as undocumented economic migrants in the country. Th e ques-
tion was further complicated by the ethnic Greek Albanians, the ‘Voreioipirotes’ 
who had also come together with their non-Greek Albanian co-patriots and for 
whom the state could not decide what policy to follow. Th us, while the then For-
eign Minister Adonis Samaras, during an oﬃ  cial visit to Albania in 1991 invited 
‘our Greek brethren’ to come to their homeland, when Voreioipirotes started 
arriving the policy changed and the same government (led by the Conservative 
Party) invited them to stay in Albania to keep Greek culture and ethnicity alive in 
that country. In short, Greek governments at the time were particularly con-
cerned with issues of political (in)stability and ethnic conﬂ ict in the Balkans and 
they thus feared that large scale economic immigration from neighbouring coun-
tries put an imminent threat on the national cohesion and political stability 
(including the stability of the borders) of the country. Excessive though these 
worries may seem today, put into their context of the mid-1990s they provide for 
a way for understanding why irregular migration took a while to come to the 
policy agenda of Greek policy makers regardless of their socialist or conservative 
background. 
During the early to mid-1990s trade unions were also puzzled with the phe-
nomenon. Qualitative interviews conducted by the author in 1996, with the 
Confederation of Greek Labourers, the Construction Worker Union of Athens 
5) A. Triandafyllidou, A. Mikrakis and M. Calloni, New Greek Nationalism, Sociological Research 
Online, 1997, 2, 1, at: www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/7.htm.
Table 1 Major expulsions from Greece according to nationality (in thousands)
Nationality 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albanian 84.3 277.0 221.0 216.5 241.2
Bulgarian – .4   1.0 0.8 1.4
Iraqi .2 .3 11.5 1.8 3.9
Pakistani – .3 1.5 1.6 1.8
Romanian .5 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.4
Turkish – .1  .4 0.6 2.3
Bangladeshi – – – 0.4 0.5
Total 86.0 282.0 239.0 225.0 250.4
Source: Baldwin – Edwards and Fakiolas, 1998: 197.
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and the Labour Centre of Athens6 showed that while a working-class solidarity 
ideology was promoted by some, the interviewees were puzzled about the sudden 
immigration developments. Under those circumstances, sticking to national 
workers’ solidarity rather than universal working class solidarity was the preferred 
option. Th us, trade union representatives would interfere at a police raid to avoid 
the deportation of an ethnic Greek Albanian irregular worker but would not take 
action in favour of ‘other’ Albanian workers. Similarly the Construction Trade 
Union of Athens would ﬁ ght for the rights of co-ethnic Greeks from the former 
Soviet Union rather than for the rights of ‘other’ immigrants that were seen as 
illegitimate competition because they were working for lower wages since they 
were undocumented7 Th is early policy choice of implementing large scale arrest-
and-deport operations costed Greece – and the EU that partly subsidised and 
supported these measures as a means of controlling irregular migration towards 
Europe – a considerable amount of money without resulting to the desirable 
eﬀ ect of actually holding migration at check. Actually these measures apart from 
being inhuman and ineﬀ ective they also reinforced a common view of migration 
as a crime and of all migrants as criminals.8 Th ey were abandoned to a large extent 
after the mid-1990s as the Greek government realised that a massive regularisa-
tion programme was probably the only realistic measure to deal with the several 
hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants who resided and worked in the 
county in the mid 1990s already.
2.1. Th e First Regularisation Programme 
After a 2-year period of consultations (1994–1996) in the framework of a parlia-
mentary committee preparing a new immigration bill (which did not manage to 
produce such a bill), the ﬁ rst regularisation programme in Greece was enacted by 
two presidential decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997. Th e programme took place 
in the ﬁ rst semester of 1998: 371,641 immigrants applied for the White Card 
(limited duration permit) which was the ﬁ rst step in applying for the temporary 
stay permit (Green Card) of 1, 2 or 5-year duration. Only 212,860 undocu-
mented foreigners managed to submit an application for a Green Card. Th e main 
reason for this was that while this ﬁ rst regularisation programme was ambitious 
in its conception and rather open in its conditions, it met with insurmountable 
organisational and practical diﬃ  culties. For one, the state services responsible for 
6) See Triandafyllidou, 2001, chapter 7. Author please provide details.
7) See also T. Lianos, Illegal Migrants to Greece and their Choice of Destination, 39(2) International 
Migration (2001) 3–28.
8) See also M. Pavlou, Th e smugglers of fear. Racist discourse and immigrants in the press of a would be 
metropolis, in A. Marvakis, D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (Eds.) Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immi-
grants in Greece), Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001, pp. 127–162Y. Panousis, Media, television ‘ene-
mies’ and migration, in X. Kontiadis and Th . Papatheodorou (Eds.) Th e reform of migration policy, Athens: 
Papazisis, 2007, pp. 203–229.
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managing the programme were hardly prepared to receive and process the hun-
dreds of thousands of applications.9 In addition, proof of legal employment for a 
minimum number of days was an important prerequisite; the reluctance of many 
employers to pay social insurance contributions made it very diﬃ  cult for many 
applicants to meet this requirement. As a result, a signiﬁ cant number of applica-
tions were unsuccessful in passing to the second but necessary phase of the Green 
Card application phase and despite the repeated extensions of the deadlines, pre-
sumably fell back into undocumented status. 
Although this programme was ill-designed and ill-managed, it opened the door 
for the development of a comprehensive migration policy in Greece since it was a 
direct oﬃ  cial acknowledgement that migrants were there to stay and that the 
Greek authorities had better take this into account. Th is programme laid the ﬁ rst 
foundations in Greece for an institutional framework able to deal with immigra-
tion. In addition, the data collected through the regularisation procedure oﬀ ered 
some ﬁ rst insights to the socio-economic and demographic features of the immi-
grant population.10
3. Greek Immigration Policy Coming of Age
3.1. Th e First Immigration Law in 2001
In 2001, and before the ﬁ rst regularisation programme had come to a close, the 
Socialist government led by Costas Simitis issued a new law (law 2910/2001) 
entitled ‘Entry and sojourn of foreigners in the Greek territory, naturalisation and 
other measures’. Th e Socialist government supported the bill arguing that it was 
inaugurating a new era in migration management in Greece. Th e then Interior 
Minister Vaso Papandreou, in a short statement on TV on the occasion of the 
voting of the law in Parliament noted that migrants were welcomed as long as 
 9) Th e main weaknesses of the programme had to do with the inability of the Greek hospitals to examine 
thousands of applicants so that these last would receive the ‘good health’ certiﬁ cates necessary for their 
applications. Also, the Ministry of Justice was unable to issue in such a short time criminal record certiﬁ -
cates to the thousands of applicants. On top of this, the Employment Institute (OAED) responsible for 
managing the programme suﬀ ered from staﬀ  shortages. Th e temporary personnel eventually hired did 
not have the necessary training to perform their tasks eﬃ  ciently and transparently. Th e whole process 
suﬀ ered from severe ideological and ethnic bias (and sometimes outright corruption) that conditioned 
decisions on the eligibility of applicants (C. Mpagavos and D. Papadopoulou, Μεταναστευτικές τάσεις 
και Ευρωπαϊκή μεταναστευτική πολιτική (Migratory trends and European migration policy) ΙΝΕ, 
Employment Institute GSEE ADEDY, 2003, Athens Study Nr. 15; I. Psimmenos and K. Kassimati, Th e 
Greek case: Immigration Control Pathways: Organisational Culture and Work Values of Greek Welfare 
Oﬃ  cers, IAPASIS Project Report, KEKMOKOP, Panteion University, Athens, July 2002, available at: 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/IAPASIS/Reports.shtml, accessed on 9 January 2008.
10) See J. Cavounidis, Migration in Southern Europe and the Case of Greece, 40(1) International Migra-
tion (2002) 45–69; T. Lianos, Illegal Migrants to Greece and their Choice of Destination, 39 (2) Interna-
tional Migration (2001) 3–28.
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they had (regular) jobs. However, migrants were welcomed only so long as they 
had work. If they became unemployed or the labour market no longer needed 
them, they were expected to leave. Th is was the justiﬁ cation put forward by the 
Minister for the short duration of the permits, that required frequent renewals 
and hence frequent checks that the migrant had still a regular job (necessary to 
renew their permits), and the absence of a long-term integration perspective for 
the immigrant population. 
Law 2910/2001 was voted as a means to combat irregular migration, cater to 
the needs of the Greek labour market and overall protect Greek society from a 
deregulated situation of massive undocumented migration. It was also presented 
as responding to Greece’s international and mainly EU obligations and recog-
nized the international character of the migration phenomenon. As Mavrodi11 
shows, however, the law paid actually little attention to EU migration legislation 
and was rather concentrated on a short sighted regulation of migration through 
restrictive legal migration channels and a large regularization programme. Migrants 
were seen by socialists and conservatives alike, as a needed albeit temporary and 
dispensable labour force.
Th is view of migration in purely instrumental terms should come as no sur-
prise since none of the Greek parties had any votes to gain in campaigning in 
favour or against immigrants. Immigrants after all were not voters and since the 
public opinion was negative12 why should the government be concerned with 
adopting a long term plan for immigration? In a recent research interview, a 
socialist MEP noted that at the time and even until recently there was strong 
resistance on the part of local party committees to view migration as a long term 
phenomenon and to recognise the need for integrating migrants not only in the 
labour market but also in society and on an equal footing. Indeed, the two main 
parties were largely in agreement in their short-sighted and instrumental view of 
migration policy, seemingly unaware of how ineﬀ ective it was.13 
In this context, it was only left-wing NGOs and the gradually emerging 
migrant associations that lobbied to put migration on the agenda. Contrary to 
the experience of other southern European countries, important national institu-
tions like the Church were not particularly active in the area of migration. It is 
actually quite surprising that the Greek Church did not even seek to attract the 
substantial number of co-ethnic and other migrants from Albania, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Russia who are Christian Orthodox. Th e explanation may lie in the 
close connection between Greek ethnicity and the Christian Orthodox religion 
11) G. Mavrodi, ‘Europeanising’ national immigration policy. Th e case of Greece, Arbeitspapiere No. 8, 
Bielefeld: Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development, 2005.
12) A. Triandafyllidou, and A. Mikrakis, Greece: A Ghost wanders through the Capital, in B. Baumgartl 
and A. Favell (Eds.), Th e New Xenophobia in Europe, London: Kluwer International Law 1995, pp. 165–79.
13) A. Triandafyllidou, Ελληνική Μεταναστευτική Πολιτική: Προβλήματα και Κατευθύνσεις (Th e 
Greek Migratory Policy: Problems and Directions), ELIAMEP Policy Texts, Nr. 6, 2005.
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which prevents the Greek Church from having an Ecumenical vocation and 
addressing issues that contest the ethnic homogeneity of its ﬂ ock.
Law 2910/2001 had a twofold aim. First, it included a second regularisation 
programme that aimed at attracting all the applicants who had not been able to 
beneﬁ t from the 1998 ‘amnesty’ as well as the thousands of new immigrants who 
had, in the meantime, arrived in Greece. Second, the new law created the neces-
sary policy framework to deal with immigration in the medium to long term. 
Th us, it provided not only for issues relating to border control but also for chan-
nels of legal entry to Greece for employment, family reunion, return to their 
country of origin (for ethnic Greeks abroad), and also studies or asylum seeking. 
It also laid down the conditions for naturalisation of aliens residing in the country.
Another 362,000 immigrants applied to acquire legal status within the frame-
work of the new programme. Even though the implementation phase had been 
more carefully planned, organisational issues arose quickly. In the Athens metro-
politan area in particular, the four special immigration oﬃ  ces set up by the 
regional government to receive and process the applications were unable to deal 
with the huge workload they were faced with. Following repeated recommenda-
tions by trade unions, NGOs, and the Greek Ombudsman14 the law was revised 
and the relevant deadlines extended. Nonetheless, resources were still insuﬃ  cient 
as work and stay permits continued to be issued for one year periods only. Hence, 
by the time one immigrant was done with the issuing of her/his papers, s/he had 
to start all over again to renew it. In addition to the cumbersome nature of the 
procedure, the costs (in money but also in time spent queuing) associated with 
this renewal process that are incurred by the migrants constituted a further hin-
drance. Only in January 2004 (Act 3202/2003) did the government decide to 
issue permits of a two-year duration, thereby facilitating the task of both the 
administration and the immigrant applicants. 
Law 2910/2001 established a complex administrative procedure for the issuing 
of stay permits with the purpose of employment or studies. During the last tri-
mester of each year, stated the law (Article 19), the Organisation for the Employ-
ment of the Labour Force (OAED) would issue a plan outlining the domestic 
labour market needs. OAED would verify the need for workers in speciﬁ c sectors 
and areas and would forward the relevant data to the Greek consular authorities. 
Interested foreign citizens would then be able to apply at their local consulates 
and register for the advertised types of work. At the same time Greek employers 
who were interested in hiring a foreign worker would apply to their local prefec-
ture (nomarchia). Subsequently the employer would choose by name people from 
the lists that in the meanwhile would have been sent by the consular authorities 
to prefectures. A prefecture would then issue and send, under certain conditions, 
14) See special report for law 2910/2001, submitted to the Minister of Interior in December 2001, http://
www.synigoros.gr/porismata.htm#.
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the work invitation a speciﬁ c foreign citizen at his/her country of origin and the 
foreign citizen would then be able to issue a visa for work purposes. Th e new 
migrant would have to produce a new series of documents upon arrival to Greece 
so as to issue a work permit (that would replace his/her work visa) and a stay 
permit, conditional upon the former. 
Th e procedure for acquiring a residence permit with the purpose of studying 
was similar to that. Every year, the Ministry of National Education and Religious 
Aﬀ airs determined the number of foreign students who could enter Greece in 
order to study, by department and sector. Based on the relevant report of the 
Ministry, those who were interested applied for a visa to their local consulates and 
followed a procedure similar to the one described above. 
Th e logic of the two cases discussed above was the same, despite the fact that 
the procedures diﬀ ered as to the speciﬁ c documents that needed to be submitted. 
It is obvious that, although the above procedure is logical, it was supported by a 
series of time consuming and costly (for the Greek state, the consulate authori-
ties, the Greek employers and the foreign workers) administrative actions. More-
over, the coordination of the whole procedure was, in our opinion, unfeasible 
because it was based on a series of assumptions (that all the steps are going to be 
accomplished correctly and in a short period of time) that were not realistic. Th e 
law emphasized the lawful character of the procedure and neglected the essence: 
the needs of the local labour market, and the importance of ﬁ lling vacant places 
in a short time, and also the fact that many immigrants, pressed by poverty or 
political oppression, will try to migrate illegally.
3.2. Th e New Immigration Laws of 2005 and 2007
Since 2001 political elites have made steps towards recognising the positive con-
tribution15 of migrants to Greek society and economy. Looking at party electoral 
platforms and other initiatives to integrate migrant populations there emerges in 
the middle of this decade, for the ﬁ rst time, an alignment of parties along the 
right and left wing axis as regards migration policy. Th us, the Socialist party (in 
power between 1993 and 2004, and main opposition party since 2004 with 
40.5% of the national vote in 2007), the Greek Communist Party of Greece 
(which received 8% in the 2007 election) and the Coalition of the Democratic 
Left (5 % in the 2007 election) have all put forward in their party programmes, 
a set of pro-active measures regarding the regularization of undocumented immi-
grants, the protection of all immigrant workers’ rights, the naturalization of 
15) For instance, Minister of Interior P. Pavlopoulos made a related declaration when he announced the 
most recent migration Act in January 2007 and the Prime Minister C. Karamanlis in his speech during 
the celebration of the Epiphany on 7 January 2008 noted that ‘we appreciate the presence and work 
of those people who have come from foreign countries to live in our society and contribute to it’. Th e 
message was broadcasted on television live that morning.
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the second generation and more generally an approach favouring integration of 
immigrants on the basis of equality of rights and duties with Greeks. Th e election 
platforms of the three parties are largely in agreement on the above issues although 
none of these issues became prominent in any of the last two pre-election 
campaigns (March 2004 and September 2007).
Th e Socialist party has taken also a number of initiatives since 2004 with a 
view of brining immigrants closer to the party. Th ese were measures directly 
decided and put forward by George Papandreou, elected leader of the party in 
2004, which were sometimes met by resistance among local and regional party 
committees (Int. 14). Th us the Socialist party has instituted since 2005 three 
positions in its Central Party Committee that are reserved for migrants. Immi-
grants were registered as party members and participated in the internal party 
election in 2006 gaining thus some weight within the party as they could decide 
the party election (Int. 14). It remains still to be seen whether this sudden interest 
for immigrants will be long lasting and whether when the Socialist party comes 
to power, these progressive positions will become policy. 
Contrary to these views of the left wing parties, the extreme right wing LAOS 
party (approximately 3% in the last election of 2007, ﬁ rst time it has entered 
Parliament but had elected an MEP in 2004 too) has adopted a nationalist and 
xenophobic view on the issue arguing that Greece is under threat because of the 
demographic problem and the uncontrolled entry of foreigners to the country, 
especially of citizens from neighbouring countries that allegedly challenge the 
territorial integrity of the nation. 
It is worth noting that the Conservative Party (in government since 2004, 42% 
of the national vote in the September 2007 election) has no positions on migra-
tion published in its party programme although the Minister of Interior often 
makes statements on TV (on the occasion of conferences, EU Interior Ministers’ 
Meetings or other events) about how legal migrants are respected and should be 
integrated in Greek society on the basis of equality. At the same time the govern-
ment discourse on migration concentrates on the ﬁ ght against irregular migra-
tion, sometimes even misquoting16 the actual numbers of apprehended migrants. 
Th e conservative government thus follows a two-pronged strategy. On one hand 
16) Th e Greek Minister of Interior Prokopis Pavlopoulos was stating in the Greek Parliament on 3 June 
2008: ‘We had 112,000 illegal migrants in 2007. We have no cooperation from Turkey. I will accuse 
[Turkey] on Th ursday [5 June 2008] when I go to Luxembourg [for the Justice and Home Aﬀ airs summit 
of EU Ministers] (. . .) forgive me for the tone. Do not consider it hypocritical or emotional. It is the 
anxiety that I feel every night when they release all the slave ships at the coasts of Greece, without any 
control from Turkey, all these people that we have to take care of with respect to their rights and their life’. 
In this statement it appears that Greece received 112,000 irregular migrants in 2007. Th e number actu-
ally refers to irregular migrants detected in Greece in 2007 of whom nearly half were detected in the 
interior. From those actually detected on the border, 35,000 were detected in the Greek-Turkish border, 
and of those 35,000, less than 15,000 were arrested in the Aegean sea. However, as the statement and 
apparently the speech in Parliament goes, the 112,000 people ﬁ gure is directly related to the arrival of 
irregular migrants (and asylum seekers) on the coasts of the Greek islands in the Aegean.
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it deliberately puts publicity on the Greek Turkish border issue and the lack 
of cooperation with Turkey. Th is comes partly as a response to criticisms from 
other member states and European NGOs17 on the violation of human rights of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers at the borders and in the nearby police 
detention centres. On the other hand, the government shows a realistic ad hoc 
approach to migration and labour market management within the country: As 
one of our interviewees suggested (Int. 2) the Minister is ready to revise the migra-
tion law as many times and as often as it is required to make it more functional 
and less bureaucratic. Th is low proﬁ le strategy can be explained on one hand by 
the lack of popular support for a more progressive policy within the government 
and among its local party members and also because of fear of losing votes to the 
right, in favour of the extreme right wing party of LAOS.
During the last election campaign of September 2004, LAOS has tried to bring 
migration on the main agenda but other parties did not follow. Th e issue has 
remained in the margins of election campaigns. As a matter of fact the two main 
parties, the Socialists and the Conservatives, have until now adopted similar 
restrictive and reactive rather than proactive policies when they were in govern-
ment. It remains to be seen whether the Socialist party new positions will be 
voted and implemented if and when the party comes to power. Overall, as it has 
happened in several European countries, LAOS plays an indirect role in the con-
tinuation of a restrictive migration policy by holding the conservative govern-
ment at check threatening to start a negative campaign and steal votes from the 
already tight government majority in Parliament (151 out of 300 MPs).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that occasionally conservative party MPs have 
taken a progressive stance towards speciﬁ c issues of migration. For instance, 
MP Katerina Papakosta had put on the agenda in 2007 the question of women 
migrants and their special needs and role towards their families. Th e municipality 
of Athens under two conservative Mayors (initially Dora Bakoyanni and more 
recently Nikitas Kaklamanis) has introduced several measures and special welfare 
programs for its immigrant residents promoting their integration. None of these 
initiatives however has led to a shift in the government approach towards a more 
long-term management of migration. 
Parallel to the shift in the Socialist party positions towards a pro-immigrant 
integration view, trade unions have also changed their views and policies on the 
matter during the past years. Th e role of the General Confederation of Greek 
Workers (GSEE), the main trade union platform in Greece has been prominent 
during the last decade as regards migration issues. GSEE has been vocal on issues 
of migrant admission and the related legal and bureaucratic hurdles that migrants 
face during this last decade. Although GSEE has been dominated by the Socialist 
17) Pro Asyl, ‘Th e truth may be bitter but it must be told’. Th e Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the 
Practices of the Greek Coast Guard, Frankfurt a. M. and Athens 2007.
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Party since the 1980s, it still remains an important agent in civil society. More-
over, GSEE is also seen as an important partner in industrial relations since its 
structure and funding allow the confederation to have oﬃ  ces in all parts of Greece 
and to develop scientiﬁ c expertise on issues of labour, migration, welfare, pension 
reform and overall social policy. Against this background, the recent cooperation 
(2006–2008) between GSEE and the Hellenic Forum of Migrants, the major 
federation of migrant organisations in Greece, in an EQUAL programme should 
not be underestimated. 
Other trade unions like the Communist Party-led federation of trade unions 
PAME, the Labour Centre of Athens (EKA), or the Union of Construction 
Workers of Greece have overcome also their ambivalent attitude of the 1990s and 
have widely embraced and supported the struggle for migrants’ regularization and 
working rights. Th is evolution is certainly related to the growing importance of 
immigrant labour focre in the total national labour force, especially in sectors like 
construction or also cleaning and catering where trade unions are still strong and 
where it was impossible to ignore any more the role of immigrant workers. Hav-
ing said this, it is still rare in Greece to ﬁ nd immigrants in leading positions in 
mainstream trade unions. With the notable and eventually tragic exception of 
Konstantina Kuneva a Bulgarian citizen (and indeed and EU citizen since 2007), 
secretary general of a trade union of cleaning staﬀ  in the Athens metropolitan 
area, no immigrant has become a prominent public ﬁ gure of the trade union 
movement to this date.
Th e impact of other civil society actors such as migrant organisations or NGOs 
on immigration legislation has been limited, able to change details (e.g. the right 
to work for family members that come to Greece through family reuniﬁ cation 
provisions) rather than shape the overall approach (Mavrodi 2005). It is also true 
that up to now Greek governments have only allowed for human rights’ NGOs 
to be heard in Parliament when discussing migration legislation and not migrant 
or other advocacy organisations.18 
Th e role of local and regional actors in this debate and/or in the formation of 
migration policy has been of little importance given the centralised structure of 
the Greek state. Although as early as law 2001 the implementation of regularisa-
tion programmes and several matters related to the migrants’ documentation 
have been delegated to municipal administrations, local authorities (with the 
exception of the Municipality of Athens that has taken up a relatively progressive 
and pro-active view on migration matters) have failed to become active players in 
the making of migration policies. Th ey have only played the part of the comply-
ing local agents that try to follow the rule of law without contesting the authority 
delegated to them or the ways to perform their tasks. Regional authorities too 
18) Mavrodi, ‘Europeanising’ national immigration policy. Th e case of Greece.
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appear to play a secondary part mainly as a nodal point for processing papers 
rather than as a socio-political actor involved in migration policy making. 
Overall the low level of decentralisation and the lack of important regional 
diﬀ erences in terms of immigrant concentration (with the exception of Athens 
and a few smaller municipalities with a higher than average percentage of immi-
grant residents that have created migration services or that have organised migra-
tion related cultural events) makes the periphery-centre and local-national axes 
of policy making or implementation of little relevance for shaping migration 
policies.
Despite the above mentioned developments within the main Greek parties and 
the larger trade unions as regards their positions on migration, the bill introduced 
by the Conservative government (law 3386/2005) voted by the Parliament in 
August 2005 has mainly been geared towards incorporating the EU Directives 
2003/86 (on the right to family reuniﬁ cation) and 2003/109 (on the status of 
long term residents) to the national legal order and simplifying some stay permit 
procedures for issuing or renewing permits. Th e 2005 law did not alter substan-
tially the logic of the Greek migration policy. Th is law has been in force since 
1 January 2006 but was modiﬁ ed in February 2007 by law 3536/2007 mainly on 
aspects of secondary importance.
Both Acts (3386/2005 and 3536/2007) have included new regularization 
programmes. Law 3386/2005 introduced a regularization program for undocu-
mented migrants who had entered Greece before 31 December 2004. Law 
3536/2007 introduced a new, smaller regularization program enabling those who 
had not been able to renew their permits, according to Law 3386, in time and 
those who were not able to collect the necessary insurance stamps. Th us the aim 
of these two programs (the second one ended on 30 September 2007) has been to 
incorporate to the legal status certain speciﬁ c categories of immigrants who have 
lived in Greece for several years but who, for various reasons, had not been able 
to regularize their residence and employment in the country.
Act 3386 regulates matters of entry, stay and social integration of third country 
nationals in Greece (refugees and asylum seekers are excluded from its ﬁ eld of 
eﬀ ect). Th e new law abolishes the existence of separate work and stay permits and 
introduces a stay permit for diﬀ erent purposes. Th e application fee of 150 euros 
for issuing a residence permit with a one year duration remains, but the fee rose 
to 300 euros and 450 euros for permits with two and three years duration corre-
spondingly. As a result of protests by immigrant organizations and other institu-
tions this provision was amended so that dependent family members did not have 
to pay the fee. According to sources in the Ministry of Interior Aﬀ airs (Int.2) 
the delays have been reduced in certain municipalities but despite that, issuing 
or renewing a permit in three months is considered a record. It is also worth 
noting that the new law has special provisions for the protection of human 
traﬃ  cking victims. 
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Law 3386 determines the right and the procedure to family reuniﬁ cation by 
incorporating the relevant EU directive to the Greek legal order. It waives the 
application fee for the stay permits of dependent persons within a family (spouse 
and children). It also incorporates the EU directive for the status of the long term 
residents. A basic knowledge of Greek language and of Greek history and culture 
are among the conditions for acquiring this status. Th e original Presidential 
Decree that determined the details for the certiﬁ cation of Greek language knowl-
edge was particularly restrictive and was heavily criticized by NGOs and immi-
grant associations. Finally, a new ministerial decree was issued in November 2007 
that simpliﬁ ed the procedure of proving one’s ﬂ uency in Greek and one’s knowl-
edge of Greek history and culture.
Finally, the law introduces an Action Plan for the social integration of immi-
grants based on the respect of their fundamental rights and with the purpose of 
their successful integration into the Greek society, emphasizing on the following 
sectors: certiﬁ ed knowledge of the Greek language, following introductory courses 
of history, culture and way of life of the Greek society, integration to the Greek 
labor market and active social participation (Article 66, paragraph 4). Th is pro-
gram has largely remained on paper as the Ministry of Finance has not made 
available the necessary resources. Moreover, a Social Integration Directorate was 
created as a response to the establishment of the European Fund for the Integra-
tion of Th ird Country Nationals19 in the summer of 2007, the funds made avail-
able by the European Union for this purpose are not yet being used by the Greek 
government due to bureaucratic inertia and lack of political will.20
It is worth noting that unfortunately this law continues to prohibit (Article 84) 
the Greek public services, legal entities, organizations of local government, orga-
nizations of public utility and organizations of social security to oﬀ er services to 
foreigners who are ‘unable to prove that they have entered and are residing in 
the country legally.’ Th e only exception to this prohibition is hospitals in emer-
gency cases and in cases of oﬀ ering health care to minors (under 18 years of age). 
Children’s access to the public education system is regulated by law 2910/2001 
regardless of their parents’ legal status.
Overall this law reiterates the restrictive migration management logic of the 
previous one, requiring for frequent renewals of stay permits, tying stay permits 
to jobs, and even hampering migrant business development by requiring that 
independent professionals should invest at least 60,000 Euro to obtain a permit 
for this purpose. Th e main reason for adopting the new law was actually the 
19) 12.06.2007 2007/435/EC: Council Decision of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the 
Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme 
Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, Oﬃ  cial Journal L 168, 28.06.2007, p. 18–36.
20) Th is most recent insight comes from a private conversation of the author with a Ministry of Interior 
employee who has worked at diﬀ erent posts in the various migration-related service of the Athens Region 
(16 February 2009). 
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incorporation of new EU legislation into national law rather than a political will 
to overhaul the migration management system. 
Th e 2005 law bears a clear imprint of EU migration legislation as nearly half 
of all the articles adopted refer to the transposition of EU directives, notably the 
family reuniﬁ cation and the long term resident status directives. Overall the 
EU has shaped a more open and integration oriented approach in Greece as it has 
been the main source of information, policies, and practices for developing the 
national migration policy and more recently, it is the main framework within 
which migration laws have to be developed. Moreover, the EU acquis provides the 
framework for human rights protection in relation to both asylum seeking and 
irregular migration control policies.21 
However, on the whole there has been no direct policy learning or transfer of 
policies and practices from other countries, be they ‘new’ hosts in southern Europe like 
Spain or Italy or ‘old’ hosts with long experience in migrant integration for instance 
such as France, the Netherlands, Britain or Sweden for that matter. On the con-
trary, Greece seems to have been stuck for a long time with its national interests’ 
concerns and an overarching view that migration is an unwanted burden for the 
country despite developments in other European countries and at the EU level.22
It is only after the 2005 law that we see an impact of EU legislation on national 
policy. Our ﬁ eldwork with the Ministry of Interior also suggests that the recent 
emphasis on a National Migration Plan and on the development of a national 
integration framework programme (both yet to start however) is due to a happy 
combination of factors: pressure to comply with EU policies, the fact that migra-
tion has come of age in Greece after more than 15 years of experience as a 
host country, the mobilization of migrants themselves, and the sometimes fortu-
nate coincidence of skilled and open minded bureaucrats holding key positions 
in the Ministry. 
4. Concluding Remarks: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement 
of Migration? 
Greece today has a 1.2 million strong immigrant population (Triandafyllidou and 
Gropas 2009) including approximately 200,000 co-ethnic immigrants from 
Albania (Voreioipirotes) and an estimated 200,000 irregular migrants.23 Immi-
grants thus account for more than 10% of the total resident population (of 
21) Pro Asyl, ‘Th e truth may be bitter but it must be told’. Th e Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the 
Practices of the Greek Coast Guard, Frankfurt a. M. and Athens 2007.
22) A. Triandafyllidou and M. Veikou, Th e Hierarchy of Greekness. Ethnic and National Identity Con-
siderations in Greek Immigration Policy, 2 (2) Ethnicities (2002) 189–208; A. Triandafyllidou, Ελληνική 
Μεταναστευτική Πολιτική: Προβλήματα και Κατευθύνσεις (Th e Greek Migratory Policy: Problems 
and Directions).
23) Maroukis, 2008, author please supply details.
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approx. 11 million) and for 12%–14% of the total labour force. Children of for-
eign parents account for about 15 % of the school population (data provided 
from IPODE, November 2008, www.ipode.gr) as there were approximately 
188,000 pupils of foreign nationality enrolled in Greeks schools (public and pri-
vate) in school year 2007–08 out of a total of 1,131,000 pupils. 
Th ese data suggest that migration has acquired an important place in Greek 
society and economy which is not however reﬂ ected in the state policy towards 
migrants. During the 1990s and to a certain extent to this day, Greek migration 
policy has been characterised by the ‘fear’ of migration and an overall negative 
view of migration as an unwanted evil or burden to Greek society and economy. 
Initially these fears were related to questions of territorial integrity and national 
unity and were fuelled by the fact that the vast majority of immigrants in Greece 
came from neighbouring countries in the Balkans (notably Albania and Bulgaria). 
Collective memories of nation-formation wars in the Balkans (in particular the 
national war of independence in the 19th century, and the Balkan wars of the 
early 20th century, that led to the incorporation of the northern regions of Mace-
donia and Th race to the modern Greek state) were projected to this day to become 
geopolitical factors that should aﬀ ect the design of migration or minority poli-
cies.24 In other words, many of the concerns that have prevented a more long term 
planning of migration and immigrant socio-political incorporation policies dur-
ing the 1990s have had to do with fears of emergence of ethnic (Albanian) parties, 
and also with concerns that immigrants are all citizens of neighbouring countries 
and hence they could be cause of political instability and nationalist claims over 
Greece in the future. Th ese concerns were largely shared among the leadership of 
both the Conservative and the Socialist party although there was signiﬁ cant vari-
ance in opinions in either party. In other words, there were fervent xenophobic 
nationalists in both parties as there were more moderate ones, privileging a civic 
and territorial view of the nation and a concomitant openness to migration and 
migrant integration.
It is these regional and foreign policy concerns alongside a lack of any experi-
ence in immigration and a generally closed attitude towards foreigners and immi-
grants that explain the delay with which Greece enacted its ﬁ rst regularisation 
programme (in 1998) and adopted its ﬁ rst comprehensive immigration law 
(2001). Th ese regional concerns also explain the delay with which the Greek 
state created a special status to accommodate the ethnic Greek Albanian immi-
grant population.25 
24) See for example: A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Gropas, Constructing Diﬀ erence: Th e Mosque Debates in 
Greece’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2009, in press; Dia Anagnostou, Deepening democracy 
or defending the nation? Th e Europeanisation of minority rights and Greek citizenship, 28 (2) West 
European Politics (2005) 336–358.
25) A. Triandafyllidou and M. Veikou, Th e Hierarchy of Greekness. Ethnic and National Identity 
Considerations in Greek Immigration Policy, 2(2) Ethnicities, (2002) 189–208.
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As the situation stabilised in the Balkans and political elites realised that migra-
tion was there to stay, the factors and concerns driving Greek migration policy 
and political elites’ interests for that matter also changed. Migrants provided for 
plentiful and ﬂ exible labour force in speciﬁ c sectors of the Greek economy, nota-
bly in agricultural, in small family enterprises, in construction, in caring and 
cleaning services and in a series of other jobs of low prestige and low pay. Th e ﬁ rst 
comprehensive immigration law voted in 2001 reﬂ ected this instrumental and 
opportunistic view of migration. Migrants should be allowed to stay in Greece, as 
the then socialist Minister of Interior stated, as long as the Greek labour market 
needed them but they should also be prepared to go when they would no longer 
have jobs. Th is was the main rationale of immigration policy and our immigrant 
informants (Int. 13) coming from diﬀ erent migrant associations and diﬀ erent 
migration experiences agree that keeping people insecure and thus exploitable has 
been a deliberate aim of Greek migration policy, supported by the two major 
political parties.
Although during this last decade there has been a signiﬁ cant shift in the posi-
tions of the Socialist and other left wing parties as well as trade unions and other 
civil society actors towards migration, this has not as yet translated into a majority 
policy shift. Th e Conservative party has continued implementing a restrictive 
migration policy in line with the rationale that prevailed in the early 2000s and 
integration measures are still hard to come by. National integration plans are 
declared but not enacted and second generation provisions for instance are non 
existent. European policies and funds are transposed and integrated into the 
national policy but their implementation on the ground is left wanting. Although 
small left wing parties, NGOs and migrant associations organise gatherings and 
public events discussing immigration policy and seeking to inﬂ uence the govern-
ment, they have to date been successful only partly. Th ey have managed to change 
speciﬁ c details in migration laws (e.g. the waiving of the stay permit renewal fee 
for dependent family members) but they have not managed to shape in decisive 
ways the policy agenda. Th e Socialist party on the other hand has concentrated its 
initiative mostly within the party mechanism by integrating immigrant members 
into party central and regional/local committees but has pressurised the govern-
ment less hard as regards immigration policy as well as border enforcement. As a 
matter of fact, migration is not yet an important issues in the policy agenda. 
Migrant integration in particular is not a priority. Partly because migrants do 
integrate through family and neighbourhood networks and through personalised 
relationships with natives who are their employers or indeed their friends but not 
through state policies or institutional structures that are largely lacking.26 During 
26) See also E. Fokas, Th e Th iva Case Study, Project Report for the WAVE (Welfare and Values) Research 
Project, unpublished manuscript, presented at a seminar in Athens: KEKMOKOP, Panteion University, 
20 February 2009.
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the past couple of years the government has paid more attention to the manage-
ment of Greece’s borders not least because it has been exposed to criticisms from 
fellow member state governments and European NGOs for its shortcomings in 
this ﬁ eld although state policies in border enforcement and asylum seeking pro-
cessing remain highly problematic. 
Overall, Greek political elites lack the political will to adopt a proactive and 
realistic migration policy plan. Partly because migration does not win nor lose 
national elections. And partly because they fear that stating publicly that Greece 
should accept economic immigrants through legal channels and that immigrants 
should become part of Greek society on a basis of equality and plurality would 
cost them votes. 
It is indeed diﬃ  cult to explain this continuously negative and reactive immi-
gration policy of Greece to this date if one looks at the changes in the left-wing 
part of the political spectrum and in organised civil society. A possible explana-
tion actually is that even within left wing parties and other NGOs the pro-immi-
grant positions are mainly led by their leaders and by a minority of activists while 
the majority of Greek citizens remain at best neutral and at worse suspicious 
toward such developments. Th e question that remains open however is whether a 
voluntaristic perspective on the part of left wing political elites will lead to the 
desired change. In the meantime, problems with migration policy implementa-
tion remain acute because the political will to solve them is lacking. 
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